Lobbying has traditionally been an enterprise of national interest organizations, which chiefly seek to influence national actors, governments in particular. However, national interest organizations are increasingly targeting the European Union as well. As the EU agenda expands in depth and scope, interest organizations at national and EU political levels might be expected to align in coalitions in order to influence EU legislation. Such strategies could increase the political leverage of interest organizations significantly -yet, lobbying coalitions consisting of organizations aligned to different political levels are little-studied. Therefore, the first aim of this article is to present a case where coalition lobbying would appear highly likely: the lobbying strategies employed by the interest organizations of Germany's energy industries in the process leading up to the EU's Renewable Energy Directive. These industries are represented by various organizations at the national and European levels.
As the EU expands the depth and scope of its responsibilities, multi-level lobbying becomes increasingly relevant for interest organizations as a strategy for achieving their political aims.
By joining coalitions in order to enhance lobbying strength, interest organizations may significantly enhance their capacity for influence. The literature on EU lobbying in general, and connected to specific fields of EU legislation, is growing rapidly. Still, relatively few indepth studies concern lobbying by interest organizations in complex multi-level advocacy coalitions within the EU, particularly with regard to EU energy policy. Understanding more about this phenomenon is important for several reasons, not least for a better grasp of political decision making in the European Union and of interest organization strategies.
The EU Directive on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (Directive 2009/28/EC, 'Renewables Directive') is well suited for illustrating the influence and coalition behaviour of interest organizations across political levels, especially because of the controversy and the high stakes for the involved organizations. After a prolonged and heated conflict involving actors from states, Directorates General, the European Parliament, the European Council, EU agencies, interest organizations and companies, the Commission significantly altered the final draft proposal regarding its most controversial part: support mechanisms for boosting the production of renewable energy in the EU. Under the final Directive, member-states may continue to choose support mechanisms themselves and trade so-called 'green certificates' only under certain conditions. Toke (2008, p. 3003) and Nilsson et al. (2009) argue that one important reason for this change was efficient lobbying and largescale political mobilization by a broad coalition of 'green' organizations, especially those representing the European renewables industry. For understanding more about the nature of multi-level lobbying, the role of the interest organizations representing the German energy industries in the negotiations leading to the Renewables Directive is particularly relevant. Such lobbying normally requires substantial resources and is not a feasible option for all interest organizations, small businesses in particular (Eising, 2007a) . National interest organizations logically emphasize the national level, but some studies have shown that many also lobby at the EU level, provided that they are adequately endowed with resources (e.g. Bouwen, 2004; Klüver, 2010; Dür and Mateo, 2012) . The German renewables industry and the utilities industry are Europe's largest within their sectors and can probably afford to pursue such lobbying strategies (Dagger, 2009; BMU, 2011) . Moreover, Germany is regarded as a key country in the negotiations (see Toke, 2008; Boasson and Wettestad, 2013) . Thirdly, German interest organizations are particularly likely to engage in multi-level lobbying, because, as noted by Eising (2007c, p. 351 ) they tend to be more specialized in their interest representation, be better endowed, control more policy information and also prioritize EU institutions more than interest organizations from other countries. Finally, inclusion of the German energy industries' European-level interest organizations is relevant for exploring the cooperation and coordination of strategies across political levels. As founding members of their European umbrella organizations, German interest organizations are likely to have good contacts with their Brussels-based representatives.
There is reason to believe that the Commission also was dependent on input from interest organizations. As complexity generally increases the influence of interest organizations (see Klüver, 2013, p. 182) , high-quality policy information was probably paramount in the creation of the Renewables Directive. Summing up, if there was multi-level cooperation and coordination as regards the Renewables Directive, German interest form of energy production -energy producers, equipment manufacturers, labour organizations, etc.
organizations were probably involved.
Lobbying is perhaps best viewed as a 'complex collective process' (Klüver, 2013, p. 53 ); however, this study focuses mainly on alliances that are intentionally created, not just organizations that push in the same direction because of similar policy goals.
The dynamics underlying the Renewables Directive are complex in terms of the number of political actors, issues and levels involved (see Nilsson et al., 2009) . Handled with as 'highly sensitive information', the strategies of interest organizations are largely invisible to the public. Therefore, analysis of the processes connected with the Directive requires an extensive descriptive account and analysis, in order to answer the following research questions as precisely and completely as possible: 1) What lobbying strategies did the interest organizations of Germany's energy industries use to influence the formulation of the EU Renewables Directive?
2) What do these strategies tell about their perceptions of where the real decision making power in the EU is situated? Is it located at the national level, or at the national and the EU levels?
Using a large-N sample, Eising (2004) has tested the 'grand governance theories' about how EU functions on the observed behaviour of interest organizations. However, few researchers have tested expectations derived from these different theories on the empirical observations of interest organization lobbying on a single EU directive. Arguably, theory testing is the most ambitious use of case studies. This article investigates the lobbying behaviour of several interest organizations representing German energy industries, assessing observations against expectations derived from Moravcsik's (1993) Why use these theories in such a design? First, liberal intergovernmentalism is indicated because energy policy has traditionally been a strong national domain (see e.g. Nilsson et al., 2009) . Second, the EU is increasingly developing more authority in the field of energy policy, and the renewables and utilities industries possess sufficient resources to conduct multi-level lobbying. The conditions for lobbying behaviour in line with MLG theory are therefore also met. Third, both LI and MLG are regarded as two of the most influential and relevant theories on EU integration today, in research and in the public debate. Finally, Franchino (2005) and others have called for more theory-testing studies of EU governance structures. This article is a part of the on-going research project, 'The EU Energy and Climate Package: Causes, Content and Consequences' (ECPack).
Theory-testing case studies usually take the form of either a most-likely case or leastlikely case format to give maximum leverage to the conclusions (Eckstein, 1975) . However, a given case may also be analysed against two rival theories -which is the approach employed here. The present study may prove particularly fruitful for confronting the two theories by offering what amounts to a most-likely case for both LI and MLG. In other words, if one of the two theories fails to account for the process, it should be seen as considerably weakened in explaining interest organizations' perceptions of power relations in EU energy policy.
Several studies have analysed aspects of the Renewables Directive. Toke (2008) , Nilsson et al. (2009 ), and Boasson and Wettestad (2010 have examined the political processes at the EU level, explaining the end results by means of various theoretical approaches in causal analyses. Toke (2008) focuses on the organizations that were for and against trading of green certificates and analyses the support mechanisms. An advocacy coalition framework (ACF) is used by Nilsson et al. (2009) to explore why the trading of green certificates was rejected as an EU-wide system. Boasson and Wettestad (2010; 2013) explain the outcomes regarding governance of the EU climate and energy package by several theories. However, relatively little scholarly attention has been devoted to investigating in detail the lobbying processes focusing on interest organizations' strategies across levels. This study thus also nuances the picture of how exactly the directive was created.
This article is organized as follows: the second section outlines LI and MLG as theory frameworks and formulates hypotheses based on them. Section three introduces the research methods used and the cases, and the fourth section presents the empirical observations of actual lobbying behaviour. The fifth section discusses whether the observations match the hypotheses and how this relates to the literature on EU lobbying. Last, the sixth section offers a summary and conclusions.
Theory background: lobbying in intergovernmental and multilevel governance systems
How does the lobbying behaviour of interest organizations change as the EU expands in depth and scope? As utility-maximizing actors, interest organizations should lobby where the power is located. Thus, lobbying patterns should reveal where the interest organizations perceive power in the EU system to be located.
Liberal intergovernmentalism emphasizes that national governments act as the predominant decision makers in international negotiations. Implicitly, interest organizations are then less important for political outcomes than are politicians in government. Governments may delegate some authority to supranational institutions, but only in order to achieve specific goals such as economic growth and prosperity. Moravcsik (1993) created a theory that many view as aimed at explaining the large intergovernmental conferences (IGCs), but here it is argued that, by extension, the theory also encompasses negotiations on secondary legislation on issues where member-states have retained a high degree of self-determination, such as energy policy. Moreover, as Moravcsik and Schimmelpfennig (2009, p. 74) stress:
[…] recent empirical research suggests that LI theory applies far more broadly than commonly suggested, including much everyday EU decisionmaking. The reason is that many decisions within the EU are taken by de facto consensus or unanimity, even when the formal rules seem to dictate otherwise.
As a part of the EU Climate and Energy Package, the Renewables Directive was subject to the co-decision procedure, requiring final consensus in the European Council and the European Parliament. That makes LI applicable to this case. According to this theory, in negotiations requiring de facto consensus, policymaking in the EU is thus only to a very limited extent determined by the EU institutions themselves. Policymaking should instead be understood as the result of intergovernmental negotiations by sovereign national governments (Moravcsik, 1993, pp. 474-480; Moravcsik, 1998, pp. 7-9; Hooghe and Marks 2001, p. 2) . Here the key member-states are essential for understanding the negotiation outcomes (Sverdrup, 1999) . In such situations, lobbying EU institutions will have limited effect because they exert little independent impact on decisions made there. If interest organizations perceive EU negotiations this way, they can be expected to focus on lobbying member-state governments.
Research expectation:
The energy industries' national and European interest organizations lobbied the German government, but paid little attention to influencing policymakers in the EU, such as members of the European Parliament or the Commission.
According to MLG, the EU's collective decisionmaking processes will lead national governments to lose control over decisions of importance to them. The political levels of governance are mutually interdependent. MLG therefore implies that political actors like interest organizations will lobby on various political levels to exert influence, working across regional, national and supranational arenas. On this assumption, interest organizations will target EU institutions because these are influential lobbying targets in their own right. MLG does not claim that the nation-state has lost its role as the most important unit in international negotiations, but rather that the EU level is also crucial (Hooghe and Marks 2001, p. 4) . This is supported by empirical observations, for example Coen and Richardson's (2009, p. 7) account of how interest organizations lobby in the EU:
As a result, we no longer see EU interest politics in terms of 'bottom-up' national interests feeding into the EU, or 'top-down' coordination of EU lobbying, rather we see a managed multilevel process with numerous feedback loops and entry points constrained by the size of the interest organization, lobbying budgets, origin and the policy area.
Several developments make the EU institutions attractive lobbying targets. The Commission, the EU's multipurpose executive body, has become more and more independent of the member-states, increasingly constituting a higher level of governance than the national governments (see e.g. Egeberg, 2006, pp. 1-3) . The Lisbon Treaty and several other EU reforms have given the European Parliament enlarged powers. For instance, more and more issues are handled under the co-decision procedure (today called the 'ordinary legislative procedure'). These legal reforms serve to give power to the EU institutions at the expense of national sovereignty -in turn making these institutions increasingly attractive and important as lobbying targets. According to MLG, interest organizations therefore should lobby both the EU institutions and the relevant government(s) intensively.
In the case of the Renewables Directive, the industries' national and European interest organizations lobbied the Commission, the European Parliament, the European Council and the German government intensively.
Method and data
In line with prominent case-study methodologists like George and Bennett (2005, p. 214) , we argue that the case-study method is useful for testing theories on data that describe microlevel phenomena. Theory-testing case studies usually take the form of either a most-likely case or a least-likely case study to give maximum leverage to the conclusions (Eckstein, 1975) . However, as noted, a given case may also be analysed against two rival theories. To test the theories, this study employs the congruence method (pattern matching), which proceeds by formulating observable expectations from each theory, and then testing the degree of compliance between these and observable outcomes (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 181; Gerring, 2007, p. 45) . In addition, process tracing has been used to obtain an indication of the effects of coalition-building on the impact that the interest organizations had on the Renewables Directive. Case studies can be used for making analytical rather than statistical generalizations (Yin, 2009) . Conclusions from this study can therefore be drawn to help in understanding the causes and pathways of lobbying in the EU, but also to strengthen, exemplify, weaken or nuance claims made in recent studies of EU lobbying, such as Klüver The organizations interviewed represent the German energy industries at the national and at the EU level. These can roughly be divided into two sectors/industries: the utilities industry 3 and the renewables industry. 4 There exist many organizations representing these industries in one way. The organizations studied here were selected on the basis of the size of the technologies they represent in terms of the quantity of energy production they contribute. 
Federation (EREF). The European umbrella organization of the renewables sector is the European Renewable Energy Council (EREC).
The reasons for choosing interest organizations at the national and the EU political levels were: a) to identify coordination and cooperation across the political levels; b) some of them (EWEA, EPIA and EREF) have German companies and associations as individual members and thus represent their interests directly in Brussels; and c) all these have German large companies producing electricity and heat from nuclear power, coal, gas and hydropower, and their equipment suppliers.
interest organizations as founding members and therefore probably constitute important indirect lobbying routes for their national members. Therefore, the study follows the advice of Dür (2008 Dür ( , p. 1223 : 'In future research on interest organization influence in the EU it will be essential to consider the existence of distinct pathways to influence.'
Data were collected primarily through one semi-structured interview with each organization in March 2011, supplemented by one conversation and one correspondence with two of them in June 2011. All interviews were taped and transcribed. Afterwards, the respondents gave feedback on the presentations of their respective organizations. Since the topic could be perceived as sensitive, the respondents were granted anonymity. Triangulation was used in order to ensure that the quality of the data was as valid and reliable as possiblefor example, interview data were checked against written material such as press releases and other data gathered in document studies. Interest organizations' representatives were asked how they had lobbied concerning the Renewables Directive, about their cooperation partners within and outside the industry, and political positions on salient issues. In addition, they were questioned about the kind of information they provided to decision makers, and the role of resources such as finances and number of personnel.
What was the debate about and how did the organizations lobby?
6
The Renewables Directive is a part of the EU's Climate and Energy Package, a coordinated legislative strategy aimed at achieving several different major EU goals. These include fulfilling commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, being an international leader in the development and innovation of renewable energy sources, and ensuring security of energy 6 Data for this article were gathered in relation to the author's master's thesis (Ydersbond, 2011) . Here, there were mainly two different coalitions of interest organizations and their affiliates. The utilities industry, headed by BDEW in Germany and EURELECTRIC in the EU, were heavily engaged. They felt that allowing member-states to determine support mechanisms themselves would have negative effects, like leading to continuation of feed-in systems (which they saw as distorting the electricity markets), stimulating renewables expansion in suboptimal locations, being detrimental to conventional electricity producers and generally uneconomical for governments. In contrast, the renewables industry, headed by the Table 3 presents the main arguments in the debates. energy issues. BDI did not address the German Parliament, which had little to do with the Directive directly. Through committee meetings, the organizations collaborated on how an EU market-based system might be made, but they never declared common political positions. In
Germany they participated in all formal hearings: BDEW on behalf of the utilities industry and BDI on behalf of businesses connected to utilities and the manufacturing industry (large energy-intensive industries in particular).
To a considerable extent, these organizations shared views. However, BDEW was keen on green certificates, whereas BDI was not as positive because some members, like the Since the German government supported feed-in tariffs, by-passing the German government by focusing lobbying efforts on the EU level might be an advantageous strategy for the utilities industry (see Baumgarter and Jones, 1991 
German renewables interest organizations 10
The German renewables interest organizations shared views on all major issues and lobbied through several different routes. The main target was the German government, but they also worked to promote the industry's interests directly to EU institutions. They coordinated their activities and political positions in the committee Arbeitsgruppe Europa (AG Europa) of the umbrella organization German Renewable Energies Federation (interview BEE, 2011). There, they produced joint information such as political positions and press statements. These 10 gained new political contacts as well as better access to existing ones. BEE sought to build as broad a base of support as possible, also among the general public, so that the politicians would know that, if they made laws that would worsen conditions for the renewables industry, they would also be going against public opinion (interview BEE, 2011) . A majority in the German Parliament, the Bundestag, shares and shared their views. Therefore, it adopted a resolution stating that member-states should determine support mechanisms themselves, and that there should be no Europe-wide trade in certificates (Dagger, 2009, p. 99) .
At the EU level, the organizations focused on lobbying friendly-minded MEPs and the unit in charge in DG Transport and Energy (DG TREN). Germany's renewables interest organizations are founding members of, inter alia, the European Renewable Energies Federation (EREF) and the European Photovoltaic Industry Association (EPIA). They participated in meetings, exchanged information and coordinated positions and strategies with them to ensure that the whole European renewables industry would speak with one voice.
These European associations constituted important indirect lobbying routes. In addition, they worked closely with EREC and created a network of national associations (BEE, 2011; interview BEE, 2011) . Some staff members held positions in interest organizations at both the national and the EU levels, as in BWE and in EWEA, which facilitated coordination of viewpoints and actions targeted at politicians at both political levels. Some renewables interest organizations furthermore increased their leverage by cooperating with private companies.
BWE also coordinated with wind energy companies (manufacturers, project operators etc.) and these also took the opportunity to approach politicians/ MEPs/ Commission etc. so that we were able to do task sharing and multiply our actions (interview BWE, 2011b).
On most issues concerning the drafting process, the renewables industry's interest organizations argued in a low-key, technical way with Commission experts. However, when it came to the debate about national support schemes versus harmonized European mechanisms, they were quite sharp and outspoken towards the Commission. If it proposed a harmonized certificate trading system instead of leaving the decision about support mechanisms to the member-states, the Commission was bluntly criticized (interview BEE, 2011).
Confrontation was sought only when it was absolutely necessary, and that was the question about a harmonized certificate trade, which would have destroyed all successful support systems for renewables in Europe. At this point, we did seek confrontation, we found it and we won. Differences about all other points could be seriously discussed and solutions found in general agreement (interview BEE, 2011).
To some extent, the heated debates in the negotiations leading to the Renewables Directive were a continuation of the lengthy conflicts that had taken place in Germany on many of the same issues a couple of decades, with coalitions on the issue of how to support renewable energy in Germany, as shown in Parliament. In addition, the organization arranged personal meetings with parliamentarians (MEPs) and others regarded as influential, and individuals expected to be positive to their views (interview EURELECTRIC, 2011). As a large and well-organized organization representing a major sector, EURELECTRIC might have been expected to achieve its aims:
but in the end, no certificate trade system was formulated in the Directive.
12 EURELECTRIC and the rest of the coalition in favour of a European certificate trading system are further described in 
European renewables interest organizations 13
At the EU level, renewables interest organizations cooperated and coordinated their political strategies and positions through the European Renewable Energy Council (EREC), the umbrella organization to which they all belong. EREC as a coalition leader issued common press releases for the entire European renewables industry. The Renewables Directive was their top priority, and represented a historic opportunity to improve investment conditions in many EU countries.
I think our engagement in this directive was total, was a hundred per cent. It is one of the most farreaching pieces of legislation about renewable energy in the world, with all its defects and limits and nonetheless, you won't find this anywhere else in the world (interview EWEA, 2011).
They lobbied the relevant bodies within the Commission, the committee in charge in the , 2007; 2008) . The renewables industry's organizations at the EU level and at national levels made a joint effort to persuade certain governments and MEPs to oppose an EU-wide green certificate scheme as a harmonized support mechanism (interview EREF, 2011). At the EU level, these interest organizations also managed to create a broad informal coalition that included major member-state governments:
We also managed to get the German and Spanish governments to write a letter to the Commission that the Commission was not allowed, or should not come up with a harmonized green certificate scheme, but that it should be up to the member-states (interview EREF, 2011).
Although the renewables industry is far smaller than the utilities industry in Europe, our data indicate that they, together with partners in the environmental movement and key memberstates like Germany and Spain in the Council, managed to get the Commission to amend the directive proposal of December 2007. The directive was subject to the co-decision procedure.
After various amendments in 2008, the member-states were allowed to decide support mechanisms themselves. These amendments were finally accepted by the European Parliament and the Council, and became law in spring 2009.
The key actors in the debates on each side are summarized in Table 2 , showing how contentious the issue was. Even subunits of major companies and environmental organizations disagreed with the opinions of their leadership, and some member-states changed stance during the negotiations. Arguments in the debates showed quite different worldviews in terms of the best type of support mechanisms and how a more sustainable Europe should be built, as show in Table 3 .
These arguments were frequently used by the coalitions, for instance in press releases, position papers, annual reports and elsewhere, with the phrasing adjusted to suit the audience in question. The renewables organizations and the rest of the environmental coalition were aided by the EU energy policy framing, as pointed out by Nilsson et al. (2009) . In particular, unstable Russian energy policies contributed to making security of supply a central political issue in many member-states. The EU had declared that innovation was the key for achieving targets such as future economic growth. Increased national generation of renewable energy would enhance domestic energy security by reducing the need for imported fossil fuels, while also leading to prospects of job creation and new industries with bright future prospects. 
Allocation
GECs will lead to allocation where the potential for renewable energy production is greatest in Europe, rather than where the subsidies are highest.
GECs will often lead to energy production located far away from people and from where the demand for energy is.
Fairness
It is unfair for renewable energy to have preferential grid access, and for it to receive so much in indirect subsidies based on taxing the grid owners.
14 The utilities have good access to the grid because there used to be monopolies where the power producers also owned the grids. Historically, the utilities have received enormous amounts in subsidies.
Renewable technologies are developing rapidly and should continue be supported until they are mature.
The future and innovation
Conventional energy production is important for Germany's/EUs energy security, should not be overlooked and cannot be phased out easily without major negative consequences.
In the future, Germany and Europe should run 100 per cent on renewable energy.
Continuation of feed-in systems will lead to higher renewables market shares because the support systems promote investments in production capacity, which stimulates investments in innovation. This 14 Feed-in systems are normally coupled with laws that ensure renewable energy producers the right to export their excess capacity to the grid regardless of how much other power is produced simultaneously. Some observations clearly support the LI theory. For example the national-level interest organizations studied here focused their main lobbying efforts on political institutions in Germany, doing their outmost to influence the government's political position. This is only natural, as all interest organizations normally focus on the political level where they have their primary affiliation. There they also enjoy the greatest legitimacy in representing the constituency to which decisionmakers must relate (see Eising, 2007a; Mahoney, 2007 ).
Germany's political positions and actions in the EU negotiations were very much in line with viewpoints held by the renewable energy industry. Moreover, the German government knew that it was essentially backed by large sectors of the population -including political parties, the environmental movement, and a majority in the Bundestag (Dagger, 2009, p. 99) . The approach to the Directive taken by the organizations as well as the government is in line with
Moravcsik's LI argumentation: to remain in office, governments in democratic societies must have support from 'a coalition of domestic voters, parties, interest groups and bureaucracies' (1993, pp. 483-484) . Moreover, the outcome of the Directive, national choice of support mechanisms, was essentially in line with LI in maintaining national sovereignty.
Still, LI seemingly cannot explain the full extent of lobbying behaviour. Our findings indicate that the German interest organizations placed high priority on lobbying also at the EU level, reflecting the key importance and salience of the issues at stake. These organizations conducted multi-level lobbying regardless of their size and resource base in terms of funding and staff, and whether or not they had their own EU office (interviews BDI, BBE, BEE and BWE, 2011; BDEW 2011a and b) . This stands somewhat in contrast to earlier studies, which have argued that multi-level lobbying is normally feasible only for large and wealthy businesses and their interest organizations (see e.g. Eising, 2007c Michelmann, 1978) , and is also seen here. Second, all German interest organizations lobbied EU institutions indirectly through their own EU-level interest organizations (interviews BBE, BEE, BWE, BDI, 2011; interview BDEW, 2011a) . This is how national interest organizations typically defend their political positions at the EU level (see e.g. Eising, 2007a) . Third, the interest organizations coordinated their political positions at the national and at the EU levels. Additionally, at both political levels, the renewables interest organizations also coordinated their political positions with informal long-time coalition partners -Greenpeace Germany and Greenpeace EU in particular (interviews BEE, BBE, BWE, EPIA, EWEA and EREF, 2011) .
Such shared positions signal to decision makers that some political positions have broad support, which increases their credibility. Cooperation is also a way of pooling resources for more efficient application (Mahoney, 2007) . All interviewees explained that they had limited resources. (interviews BEE and BWE, 2011b) . However, in contradiction to Coen's (2005, p. 205) descriptions of coalitions as 'short-life issue networks' typical of public and business interest organizations, our findings indicate that the coalitions were rather long-term.
Not all interest organizations were equally active, however: the data show that the larger organizations, such as BDI, BDEW and BEE lobbied EU institutions more frequently than the small organization in the sample, BBE. The German Renewable Energies Federation, BEE, acted as a leader for the whole German renewable industry. BDEW and BDI had similar roles with regard to the German utilities industry and the German energy-intensive industry.
As expected, the European-level interest organizations lobbied the EU institutions intensively (see e.g. Coen, 2007) . Also at the EU level, the organizations lobbied according to their resources. The largest renewables interest organization in terms of staff, EWEA, followed the political processes very closely and met with more people than did, for example, the smaller EPIA.
While EPIA concentrated on like-minded individuals within the European Parliament and elsewhere, EWEA lobbied both 'friends and foes'. In addition, EWEA was the only organization to conduct a political campaign specifically aimed at decision makers (interviews EWEA, EPIA, EREF and EURELECTRIC, 2011). Thus, EWEA, with of its sizeable resources, could function as a leader and broker on behalf of the whole European renewable energy industry, together with EREC, the umbrella organization.
These observations of the EU-level interest organizations also support the hypothesis based on the MLG theory. MLG outlines not only possible 'uploading' of influence and targeted lobbying behaviour at different political levels, but also 'downloading' to lower levels of governance (Hooghe and Marks, 2001 system, and that it might be the 'aggregated information supply, citizen support and economic power of coalitions' that matters for influence (Klüver 2013, p.141 and p. 200) .
Thus, we have seen that the lobbying efforts of interest organizations were genuinely multilevel because the EU institutions were deemed important for the outcome of the negotiations. Liberal Intergovernmentalism fails to explain important aspects of this lobbying behaviour, rendering LI less useful as a tool for understanding lobbying in EU energy policy.
Future studies should take into account the role of cooperation between lobbying at different levels of government. This kind of coordination and cooperation should also be investigated when studying causal processes, such as why legislation like the Renewables Directive ended up in its present form. Still, the fact that multi-level lobbying did take place is in itself not enough to discredit LI as an analytical tool for understanding political processes in the EU.
Conclusions
Using two theories -Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Multi-Level Governance -this study has addressed the following research questions:
1) What lobbying strategies did the interest organizations of Germany's energy industries use to influence the formulation of the EU Renewables Directive?
2) What do these strategies tell about perceptions of where the real decision making power in the EU is situated? Is it located at the national level, or at the national and EU levels?
The LI theory was supported by only some of the findings. While the accumulation of interest on the national level can account for some of the lobbying behaviour of interest organizations, it cannot explain the full extent of the lobbying (and accompanying coordination) that these organizations conducted in order to influence EU decisions. Altogether, LI seems inadequate for explaining the actual lobbying behaviour of interest organizations as well as their understanding of EU decision making processes. Our findings indicate that they regard decision making in the EU as something significantly different from (and more complex than)
mere decisions based on negotiations by sovereign states in the Council of Ministers or the European Council. When EU decisions are particularly important for them, interest organizations conduct multi-level venue shopping (Baumgarter and Jones, 1991) within the EU's multi-level governance system. Otherwise, it would be rational to lobby only decision makers at the national level, or the intergovernmental EU bodies. These findings are in line with earlier research, such as that of Eising (2004, p. 212) , who argues that 'the concept of multi-level governance captures the essence of interest intermediation in EU best'. Further, similar to Dür and Mateo (2012) and Beyers and Kerremans (2012, p. 276) , this study finds that the national business associations studied frequently lobby EU legislation on salient issues. This seems to be an increasing trend. On the other hand, this study has also shown that all organizations in the sample, also the smallest ones, participated in such lobbying, which appears to be a rather uncommon finding. status. This means that their presence can contribute to better-informed EU policies in a political system increasingly characterized by multi-level governance. LI cannot account for these phenomena. Given the 'most likely' character of the policy field, this indicates serious shortcomings in the explanatory leverage of LI theory in relation to EU lobbying.
We find support for MLG theory in the majority of the empirical findings. Future studies on industrial lobbying should take this into account, enquiring into multi-level lobbying strategies where it is reasonable to expect interest organizations to lobby at multiple levels, rather than focusing solely on the national or the international level. With the EU steadily increasing in depth and scope, research attention should focus on coordinated lobbying, as interest organizations appear to lobby across political levels to an increasing extent. Finally, we note that lobbying by complex multi-level advocacy coalitions may be decisive for political outcomes in the EU, which testifies to the substantial importance of coordinated lobbying behaviour and coalition formation across levels. Acronyms and abbreviations 
